Armenia–Azerbaijan Relations Could Vance’s visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan herald further American weapons deals? While the US’s role in the South Caucasus is expanding, significant political and economic factors argue against a full partnership reset. by Noah Higgins • 8 min read Share ▲ Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and US Vice President JD Vance standing next to US-made V-BAT surveillance drones which Armenia has purchased.
Official photo. US Vice President JD Vance’s trip to the South Caucasus highlighted the rising American interest in the region and placed new focus on the US’s deepening bilateral relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan, both of which hosted Vance. Meanwhile, Georgia, once the US’s closest partner in the region, found itself left off the itinerary .
These expanding relations were initiated by the US’s role in securing a preliminary peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which was initialled by the leaders of both countries in August 2025. That agreement envisioned a significant role for the US in promoting regional connectivity through the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). The Trump administration is also increasingly involved in expanding economic investment and fostering nascent security relationships with both countries.
Vance’s trip was especially notable for including the announcement that, for the first time ever, the US would complete sales of military equipment to both countries A US-made V-BAT surveillance drone. Official photo. It is clear the Trump administration is pursuing a policy of actively expanding American arms exports worldwide in order to strengthen the American defense industrial base.
Armenia and Azerbaijan are simply opportunities to expand American production within that overarching policy framework. The peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan is also arguably the only case where the Trump administration’s focus on achieving peace through bilateral negotiations and business deals has enjoyed unalloyed success. Consequently, the administration is eager to take actions that further that process and allow them to publicise that success.
It is unclear, however, whether American interest in the region will continue beyond the current administration. Indeed, while the announcement of the sale of surveillance drones to Armenia and naval patrol boats to Azerbaijan appears to augur a new era in US arms exports to the region, political and economic constraints will limit the South Caucasus’s potential as a market for US defence exports. Armenian attempts to diversify amidst economic constraints Prior to the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the overwhelming majority of Armenia’s arms imports came from Russia, which often subsidised Armenia’s purchases.
This dynamic has changed significantly in recent years. Relations between Armenia and Russia deteriorated rapidly after Russia’s inaction in the face of continued military pressure from Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the war. Yerevan also lost faith in Russia’s reliability as an arms supplier after Russia failed to deliver weapons systems Armenia had ordered, which Russian officials blamed on the impact of their full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet in Moscow on 1 April 2026. Official photo. ‘The prior strategy of embedding Armenia within only one major external relationship is seen in Yerevan today as a catastrophic error’, Laurence Broers, Associate Fellow with Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia Programme, tells OC Media .
As a result, Armenia has sought to diversify its security relationships and, to that end, suspended its participation in the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Armenia has since imported weapons systems from France and India , with the latter becoming the largest provider of arms to Armenia in 2024. ‘French weaponry indicates some European concern for Armenia’s security, while Indian weapon imports do not trigger Russian fears as much as European or American weapons’, Joshua Kucera, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, tells OC Media , highlighting how these new partnerships also serve a specific political purpose.
India’s Chief of Defence Staff Anil Chauhan during his visit to Armenia. Official photo. Given its significant geopolitical reorientation in recent years, the Armenian government would likely welcome the opportunity to add the US to its list of security partners.
In 2025, the country hosted US military forces for bilateral exercises for the first time. This eagerness for security cooperation includes an openness to purchasing American military equipment, though, as previously mentioned, any opportunity would have to be weighed against further deterioration of relations with Russia. However, economic and political factors constrain Armenia’s ability to dramatically expand its imports of US material.
Economically, Armenia’s central challenge in its long rivalry with Azerbaijan is the considerable material disparity between the two countries. Armenia’s population of 3 million and GDP of $26 billion are each only approximately a third the size of Azerbaijan’s population of 10 million and GDP of $74 billion. This discrepancy means that Armenia must be highly efficient with its limited resources to be capable of matching Azerbaijan’s considerably larger military potential.
American military equipment is not renowned for being inexpensive and is almost certainly less cost effective for Armenia than alternative suppliers. Politically, while tensions have certainly lessened since the initialling of the draft peace agreement, Azerbaijan and Armenia continue to regard each other as their primary security threat. This dynamic means that any extensive weapons sales to Armenia would likely strain relations between the US and Azerbaijan as well as Azerbaijan’s partner, Turkey.
As the controversy over Vance’s tweet
Topics: #vance #armenia #azerbaijan
